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Preface 
The problem of how t o  make a 'tfair division" of resources among 
competing interests arises in many areas of application at IIASA. One 
of the tasks in the System and Decision Sciences area is the systematic 
investigation of different criteria of fairness and the formulation of 
allocation procedures based thereon. 
A particular problem of fair division having wide application in 
governmental decision-making is the apportionment problem. An 
application has rccently arisen in the debate over how many seats in the 
European Parliament to  allocate t o  the different member countries. 
Discussions swirled around particular numbers, over which agreement was 
difficult t o  achieve. A systematic approach that seeks to  establish bases 
for agreement on the criteria or "principles" for fair division should stand 
a better chance of acceptance in that it represents a scientific or system- 
analytic approach t o  the problem. 

Abstract 
Methods to allocate seats in proportional representa- 
tion systems are investigated in terms of several underly- 
ing common-sense properties. In particular, the idea of 
stability is introduced, and the method of Jefferson (or 
d'Hondt) is characterized. 

Criteria for Proportional Representation 
INTRODUCTION 
There exist wholesale numbers of possible election procedures. 
A basic characterization has been made of these into "plurality 
systems" and "proportional representation systems." 
In a plurality system an elector usually casts one vote for 
the candidate or the (party) list of candidates of his or her 
choice in some election district, and the candidate or list receiv- 
ing a majority or plurality is elected. Such systems are based on 
a notion of geographical representation. Mid-nineteenth century 
Europe saw an increasing dissatisfaction with plurality systems as 
unfair to minorities, for small political parties were effectively 
barred from having any representation whenever their adherents 
were distributed throughout many single-member election districts. 
This led to the idea of proportional representation which, in 
its pure form, has electors cast one vote for a party or party 
list in a multi-member district and then, by some rule, metes 
numbers of seats "proportionally" among the parties according to 
their respective vote totals. Of course, variants of both types 
of system exist, as do complex mixtures of both. 
This paper is focused on the pure form of the proportional 
representation problem: voters cast a single vote for a party in 
a multi-member district and the question is to determine the just 
number of representatives due each party. Exact proportionality 
cannot, in general, be achieved since representation must be in- 
tegral. Some "rounding" must take place. Consider, for example, 
the problem of Table 1 with party vote totals as given and 36 
seats to be allocated. Six different possible solutions are ad- 
vanced ... which should be chosen? 
In fact the identical problem arises under plurality systems, 
but in a different guise. For, usually, a nation is divided into 
states or provinces and each single-member election district is 
wholly contained in one such subdivision. How many election dis- 
tricts or representatives should one geographical region be allo- 
cated? This problem is known as the apportionment problem. Of 
course, geographical apportionment can arise in proportional rep- 
resentation systems too. The apportionment problem in the United 
States arises from interpreting the somewhat vague Constitutional 
mandate "...Representatives...shall' be apportioned among the sev- 
eral states ... according to their respective members." Senator 
Daniel Webster of Massachusetts caught the spirit of the intended 
solution to the apportionment problem in his definition: "TO 
apportion is  t o  d i s t r i b u t e  by r i g h t  measure ,  t o  s e t  o f f  i n  j u s t  
p a r t s ,  t o  a s s i g n  i n  due  and p r o p e r  p r o p o r t i o n "  [17,  p .  1071. But ,  
a p p e a r a n c e s  t o  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  a n  o p e r a t i o n a l  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  n o t  
e a s i l y  fo r thcoming  and Uni ted  S t a t e s  h i s t o r y  is r i c h  w i t h  c o n t r o -  
v e r s i e s  o v e r  proposed s o l u t i o n s  and methods.  I t  s u f f i c e s  t o  con- 
s u l t  T a b l e  1  t o  s e e  why. 
T a b l e  1  
Possible Allocations 









F u r t h e r m o r e ,  what seems r i g h t ,  j u s t  and p r o p e r  i n  d e a l i n g  
w i t h  a p p o r t i o n m e n t  i n  p l u r a l i t y  s y s t e m s  may o r  may n o t  seem s o  
i n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  a l l o c a t i o n  i n  p r o p o r t i o n a l  e l e c t i o n  sys tems .  
D i f f e r e n t  s e t s  o f  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  p o s s i b l e  methods f o r  s o l v i n g  t h e  
u n d e r l y i n g  problem a r e  s u g g e s t e d  by t h e  p r a c t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  i n  
which t h e  m a t h e m a t i c a l  a l l o c a t i o n  problem i s  embedded. 
FORElULAT I O N  
L e t  p  - = ( p l , .  . . , p s )  be  t h e  ( p o s i t i v e ,  i n t e g e r )  v o t e  t o t a l s  
of s p a r t i e s  ( o r  t h e  number o f  c i t i z e n s  d e s e r v i n g  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
i n  s r e g i o n s ) ,  where e a c h  p .  > 0 ,  and h  2 0  i s  t h e  number o f  
s e a t s  t o  be a l l o c a t e d  ( o r  a p p o r t i o n e d ) .  The problem i s  t o  f i n d  
a n  alZocation for h: a n  s - t u p l e  o f  non-nega t ive  i n t e g e r s  
( a l , .  . . , a s )  whose sum i s  h .  A  solution of  t h e  problem i s  a  
f u n c t i o n  f which t o  any p o p u l a t i o n  v e c t o r  P and a l l  h a s s o c i a t e s  
a  un ique  a p p o r t i o n m e n t  f o r  h ,  a i  = f i ( p , h )  - 2 0  where li a i  = h .  
If f is a solution, then fh will represent the function f re- 
stricted to the domain (p,hl) where 0 ( h' ( h. fh is a s o l u -  
- h t i o n  up  t o  h, and f is an e x t e n s i o n  o f  f . 
A specific allocation method may give several solutions, 
since "ties" may occur when using it, as for example when two 
parties have identical vote totals but must share an odd number 
of seats. For this reason it is useful to define an a l l o c a t i o n  
method 8 as a non-empty set of solutions. Thus, in particular, 
a solution up to some given h may have several different exten- 
sions in a method M. In the sequel only s y m m e t r i c  methods of 
allocation are considered, that is, methods in which the ordering 
of the parties in the list (plr ...,p, ) is immaterial. This is a 
clearly essential property. 
The choice of an allocation, or of an allocation method, 
cannot and should not revolve about the rival numerical results 
of one solution over another. Rather, the issue is to decide 
upon a rule that is "fair," that is, whose qualitative proper- 
ties satisfy criteria or "principles" acceptable to both citizen 
and politician. It is as Representative E.W. Gibson said on the 
floor of the U.S. Congress in 1929, "The apportionment of Repre- 
sentatives to the population is a mathematical problem. Then 
why not use a method that will stand the test...?" [ 5 ] .  
STABILITY 
Three principal methods seem to have been considered for 
proportional representation systems: Sainte-Lague's [15], 
d'Hondtls [8,9], and Hamilton's [7], usually known as "la rgpar- 
tition au plus fort reste." In the apportionment literature 
Sainte-Lague's and d'Hondtls have found their places (see [lo] ) ,  
under other names, in a class of five so-called "modern" [4,13] 
methods which, from about 1920 through 1974, were the only ones 
collectively considered for apportioning the United States House 
of Representatives. 
The five "modern" methods were first grouped by E . V .  Huntington 
in 1921 [Ill via an approach to allocation (or apportionment) based 
on pairwise comparisons of "inequality in representation." Given 
vote totals = (pl, ...,p s) and an allocation = (al, ..., as) for h 
consider the numbers pi/ai and ai/pi. These represent the number 
of votes per representative of party i and the number of represen- 
tatives per vote of party i. If pi/ai > p./a. or a./p. < a./p. 
3 I' 1 1  I 3 '  
or a > ai (p ./pi) , or.. . , (pi/ai) (a ./p . ) > 1, then party j is b e t t e r  j I I I 
o f f  than party i. Given a particular measure or test of inequality 
between a pair of parties such as /pi/ai - pj/aj or ai/Pi - aj/pjl 
it is natural to ask whether the amount of inequality can be re- 
duced by a transfer of one seat from the better-off party to the 
less-well-off party. Given a measure or test T an allocation is 
said to be in equilibrium if no transfer reduces the value of T 
for any pair of parties. Of course, certain conceivable measures 
T may not (and do not) admit equilibrium solutions for all vote- 
total distributions, but ~untington showed [10,11] that five 
measures T do. 
Huntington's approach can be developed in several ways, One 
is via the tests of inequality in representation mentioned above. 
Another (see [13,10]) is by letting d(a), a divisor criterion, be 
any real-valued monotone-increasing function on the non-negative 
integers such that d(0) 2 0. Given a divisor criterion d(a), a 
divisor method @ of allocation is the set of solutions obtained 
recursively as follows: 
(ii) If ai = f. (p,h) is an 8-allocation for h and k is some 
1 - 
one party for which 
pk/d(ak) 2 pi/d(ai) for 1 ( i ( s 
then 
fk(?,h+l) = ak + 1 , fi(pr h+l) = ai for i # k . 
- 
The meaning of such an allocation method is that the numbers 
pi/d (ai) represent some measure of the "priority" of a party to 
receive one more seat, the next seat being given to the most de- 
serving party. The divisor function d(a) thus represents some 
sort of "weighting" of the current number of seats the party has. 
The five "modern" methods proposed by Huntington are divisor 
methods, and their various names, associated tests of inequality 
and divisor criteria are given in Table 2 below. Huntington 
himself argued strongly and effectively for the method he 
called Equal Proportions. It is in equilibrium for the mea- 
sure of inequality which is the relative difference* between 
the pair of numbers p./a. and p./a. and also between ai/pi 
1 1  1 1, 
and ai/pi. This method is now <hedlaw for apportionifig the 
J J  
U.S. House of Representatives [ 1 4 ] .  
* 
The relative difference between x and y is ( x  - y 1 /min (x,y) . 
Table 2. Huntington's five methods. 
&thcd In Equilibrium for Test T Divisor Criterion 
(where pi/ai 2 P j/a. ) I  d (a) 
Smllest Divisors (SD) TI: a. - a. (p./p.) a 
- 1 1 1 1  
Harrronic Wan (@) T2 : pi/ai - p ./a. 2a (a+1) / (2a+l) 
I  I  
-1 Proportions (E) T ~ :  (p.a./p.a.) - 1 (a (a+l) 1 /2 
1 1  I '  
Webster (y) Tq: aj/pj - ai/pi 
or Major Fractions 
or Sainte-La@ Formula 
Jefferson ( 2 )  
or Greatest Divisors 
or dlHondt 
or plus forte myenne 
The method of equal proportions (E-P) necessarily first gives 
to each party one seat. As an example of a divisor method in use, 
Table 3 below gives E-P allocations to parties for the example 
of Table 1 for a house size h ranginq from 6 to 16 seats. 
DIHondt's method [8,9], or "la rGpartition 3 la plus forte 
moyenne," also called in the apportionment literature "the method 
of greatest divisors," was in fact first proposed by Thomas 
Jefferson [I21 in 1792 and has therefore been called J e f f e r s o n ' s  
method J [3]. Sainte-Lague's method [15], also called in the 
apportionment literature "the method of major fractions," was in 
fact first suggested in embryonic form by Daniel Webster [I71 in 
1832 and has therefore been called the W e b s t e r  method W 131. A 
particular variant of W is the modified method of odd numbers 
(see, e.g., [6]) used in some Scandinavian countries. It is 
defined by: d (0) = 7/10 (instead of d (0) = 1/2), and otherwise 
the divisors are identical with those of W, d(a) = a + 1/2. 
It is an interesting historical note that ~ainte-Lague [IS] 
came upon the Webster method quite independently via the idea of 
minimizing a total measure of the inequality of an allocation. 
He proposed that an allocation should minimize 
s i n c e  i n  a  p e r f e c t  a l l o c a t i o n  h/p = ai/pi f o r  a l l  i. The webs ter  
method p rov ides  s o l u t i o n s  which do t h i s .  I n  t h e  same paper  
Sainte-Lagiie sugges t s  i n  words ( though n o t  i n  symbols) t h a t  one 
could  be i n t e r e s t e d  i n  minimizing 
b u t  t h a t  "one i s  l e d  t o  a  more complex r u l e . "  I n  f a c t ,  t h i s  g i v e s  
p r e c i s e l y  t h e  method of equal  p r o p o r t i o n s .  
Table 3 .  Sample E-P a l l o c a t i o n s .  
P a r t y  
Vote To ta l  
House s i z e  
I t  i s  u s e f u l  t o  know t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  " l o c a l "  c r i t e r i o n  by 
which t o  v e r i f y  whether a l l o c a t i o n  belongs t o  a  d i v i s o r  method. 
Lemma. = ( a l , .  . . , a  ) is a n  a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  h  of a  d i v i s o r  
S 
method wi th  d i v i s o r  c r i t e r i o n  d ( a )  i f  and o n l y  i f  
min p . / d ( a . - 1 )  2 maxi p i /d(a i )  . j I I 
Thi s  i s  immediate by d e f i n i t i o n . 0  
P a r t i e s  i n  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  systems a r e  dynamic. 
They may group t o g e t h e r  f o r  e l e c t o r a l  purposes ,  b u t  t hey  a l s o  
may s p l i n t e r .  I t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  behavior  of p a r t i e s  w i l l  be 
in f luenced  by t h e  mathematical  consequences of t h e i r  c o a l e s c i n g  
a s  v e r s u s  s p l i n t e r i n g .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  it i s  p e r t i n e n t  t o  a s k  how 
t h e  number of s e a t s  a l l o c a t e d  by a  method M t o  t h e  j o i n t  v o t e  
t o t a l  of two p a r t i e s  coa l e sced  i n t o  one compares w i th  t h e  s e a t s  
a l l o c a t e d  by M t o  t h e  two p a r t i e s  s e p a r a t e l y .  Consider  a  sym- 
m e t r i c  method M and a  problem w i t h  v o t e  t o t a l s  p  i n  which some 
p a r t y  has  p* v o t e s  and ano the r  p v o t e s ;  and c o n s i d e r  t h e  r e s u l t  
o f - coa l e sc ing  t h e  s t a r -  and t h e  ba r -pa r ty  i n t o  one p a r t y  w i th  p* 
+ p  v o t e s ,  keeping a l l  o t h e r  p a r t y  v o t e  t o t a l s  t h e  same. Le t  
f E M be a  s o l u t i o n  i n  which a*  and Z a r e  t h e  number of s e a t s  
a l l o c a t e d  t o  t h e  s t a r -  and t h e  ba r -pa r ty ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  i n  an  
a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  h. Then M i s  s a i d  t o  be s t a b l e  i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  
an  a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  h  i n  which t h e  number b  of s e a t s  a l l o c a t e d  t o  
t h e  coa l e sced  p a r t y  s a t i s f i e s  a *  + Z - 1  ( b  5 a* + + 1.  
Theorem 1 .  A d i v i s o r  me thod  3 u i t h  d i v i s o r  c r i t e r i o n  d ( a )  
s a t i s f y i n g  
i s  s t a b l e .  
P r o o f :  Suppose t h a t  an  a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  h  of a  problem spec- 
i f i e d  by t h e  v o t e  t o t a l s  p = ( p l , .  . . ,ps )  i s  + = ( a l , .  . . , a s )  and 
- 
t h a t  p a r t i e s  1  and 2  form a  c o a l i t i o n  having v o t e  t o t a l  pl  + p2.  
Then we show t h a t  i f  ( a l + a 2 , a j ,  ..., as)  i s  n o t  an a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  
h  t hen  t h e r e  e x i s t s  one t h a t  g i v e s  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  e i t h e r  
a  + a 2  - 1  o r  a l  + a 2  + 1  s e a t s .  1  
I f  a l  + a 2  i s  no t  a  s o l u t i o n ,  t hen  by t h e  Lemma 
~ h u s  since 9 satisfies (I), either 
(3) (p,+p2)/d(al+a2-1) < max p./d(a.) = pk/d(ak) = X (k#1,2) 
j#l12 3 
(4) (p1+p2)/d(al+a2) > min pi/d(ai-1) = pk/d(ak-1) = 6 (L#1,2) . 
i#1,2 
Before proceeding, notice that if silvi 2 0 (i=1,2) then 
max {sl/vl 1s2/v21 ) (s1+s2)/ (v1+v2) 2 min {sl/vl ,s2/v2} . 
This inequality is used repeatedly. 
Consider the first case (3). From (2) we have 
> IMX pi/d (ai) 2 X -
i 
and find 
showing that (al+a2-l,a3, ...,ak+lI...,as) is an allocation for h. 
On the other hand, consider (4). Since by (2) 
we f i n d  
showing t h a t  ( a l + a 2 + l , a 3 ,  . . . , a L - I , . - - , a s )  i s  an  a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  h . o  
C o r o l l a r y .  H a m i l t o n ' s  f i v e  d i v i s o r  m e t h o d s  a r e  s t a b l e .  
The method t h a t  has  been and i s  most o f t e n  proposed f o r  pro- 
p o r i i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  happens t o  be  t h e  seemingly most n a t u r a l  
one. Although known by s e v e r a l  names, i nc lud ing  " l a  r g p a r t i t i o n  
au p l u s  f o r t  r e s t e "  and " V i n t o n ' s  method of 1850," it was appar-  
e n t l y  f i r s t  proposed by Alexander Hamilton [ 7 ]  i n  1792 and has  
t h e r e f o r e  been c a l l e d  t h e  H a m i l t o n  method [ 3 ] .  We d e f i n e  t h e  
e x a c t  q u o t a  of p a r t y  j  t o  be q  = qj ( p , h )  = pjh / l ip i .  I t  i s  t h e  j  
e x a c t l y  p r o p o r t i o n a l  number o f  s e a t s  deserved-  by p a r t y  j  and t h e  
number t h a t  one would wish t o  a l l o c a t e  t o  j  were it i n t e g r a l .  
Otherwise,  each  p a r t y  should,  it seems, r e c e i v e  a t  l e a s t  a s  many 
s e a t s  a s  [q,] ( t h e  l a r g e s t  i n t e g e r  l e s s  t han  o r  equa l  t o  q ; ) .  
J J 
Thi s  mo t iva t e s  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n s  of t h e  H a m i l t o n  m e t h o d :  F i r s t ,  
g i v e  t o  each  p a r t y  i Lqi] s e a t s ;  t h e n ,  o r d e r  t h e  p a r t i e s  by t h e i r  
f r a c t i o n a l  remainders  di = qi  - [ q i J  2 - 0 i n  a  p r i o r i t y  l i s t  
2 J 2 
d l  . d .  Second, g i v e  one a d d i t i o n a l  s e a t  t o  each of  t h e  
f i r s t  h  - 1 Lqi] p a r t i e s  on t h e  l i s t .  I f  t h e r e  a r e  t i e s  t hen  
.J 
t h e r e  e x i s t  d i s t i n c t  arrangements  of t h e  p r i o r i t y  l i s t  and,  hence,  
p o s s i b l y  s e v e r a l  s o l u t i o n s .  I n  f a c t ,  t h i s  method, under t h e  name 
of t h e  V i n t o n  method o f  1 8 5 0 ,  was adopted a s  t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  
appor t ionment  problem f o r  t h e  U.S. House of  Represen ta t i ves  f o r  
t h e  censuses  of 1850 through 1900. 
Theorem 2 .  The H a m i l t o n  method i s  s t a b l e .  
p r o o f :  Consider  any two p a r t i e s ,  s ay  i = 1 , 2 ,  and suppose 
t h a t  i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  problem p a r t y  i has  an e x a c t  quota qi = ni 
+ r i r n i  2 0 i n t e g e r  and 0 2 r i  < 1 ,  and l e t  a i  be t h e i r  a l l o c a -  
- - - - 
t i o n s  a t  h. Then f o r  t h e  problem i n  which p a r t i e s  1  and 2  form 
a  c o a l i t i o n ,  i t s  e x a c t  quota  f o r  h  i s . q l  + q2  = n l  + n2 + r l  + r2 .  
Le t  b  be t h e  number of s e a t s  g iven  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  by t h e  Hamilton 
method. 
We cons ide r  s e v e r a l  c a s e s .  F i r s t ,  i f  b  = nl  + n2 then  r l  + 
r2  < 1 ,  implying t h a t  t h e  same t o t a l  number of p a r t i e s  i s  rounded 
up in both problems. If r1,r2 > 0 then it must be that ai = n i 
(i=1,2. For otherwise one of the two parties would have a re- 
mainder ri high enough in the list to warrant an extra seat while 
rl + r2 > r1,r2 is not high enough, which cannot be. If rl = 0 
then al = nl and a2 = n2 or a2 = n2 + 1; in either case the 
criterion for stability is satisfied. 
If b = nl + n2 + 1, then since a = ni or n + 1 there is i 
nothing more to show. If b = nl + n + 2, then rl + r2 > 1. 2 
Suppose stability is not satisfied, i.e., that a.= ni (i=1,2). 1 
Then for some party k f 1,2, rl + r2 - 1 2 - rk while rl rk and 
r < r Thus 2rk - 1 rk and rk 2 1, a contradiction.0 2 = k' 
MONOTONICITY AND CONSISTENCY 
The Hamilton method came under sharp criticism and was sub- 
sequently abandoned by the U.S. Congress for, in 1881, it chanced 
to admit the not so congenial "Alabama paradox" [16]. Consider the 
vote totals of Table 1 and apply H to apportion 37 and 38 seats 
(Table 4): parties D and E both lose a seat as the total number 





&act quota 35 
H allocation 35 
9.711 8.812 6.982 5.115 3.229 1.152 
10 9 7 5 3 1 
35 
35 
H allocation 36 
Exact quota 37 
H allocation 37 
Exact quota 38 
H allocation 38 
Exact quota 39 
H allocation 39 
10 9 7 5 4 1 
10.265 9.316 7.380 5.407 3.413 1.218 
10 9 7 6 4 1 
10.543 9.568 7.580 5.533 3.506 1.251 
11 10 8 5 3 1 
10.820 9.819 7.779 5.699 3.598 1.284 








Census,  Alabama s u f f e r e d  by d r o p p i n g  from 8  t o  7 s e a t s  a s  h  i n -  
c r e a s e d  f rom 299 t o  300. T h i s  phenomenon i s  n o t  r a r e  n u m e r i c a l l y .  
F o r  example ,  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  s t a t e s  used  t o  a p p o r t i o n  t h e  
U.S. Congress  i n  1901 gave r ise  t o  many s i m i l a r  o c c a s i o n s .  Between 
h  = 381 and  h  = 391, Maine changed between 2  and 3  s e a t s  s i x  t i m e s  
and l e d  a  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h a t  S t a t e  t o  e x c l a i m  " . . . i t  d o e s  seem 
a s  though  mathemat ics  and s c i e n c e  h a s  combined t o  make a  s h u t t l e -  
cock* and b a t t l e d o r e *  o f  t h e  S t a t e  o f  Maine i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  
s c i e n t i f i c  b a s i s  upon which t h i s  b i l l  i s  p r e s e n t e d "  ( 8  J a n u a r y  1 9 0 1 ) .  
An e v i d e n t  p r o p e r t y  o f  any  a l l o c a t i o n  method i s  t h a t  t h e  num- 
b e r  o f  s e a t s  a c c o r d e d  t o  any p a r t y  n o t  decrease i f  t h e  house  s i z e  
increases. A method 8 i s  s a i d  t o  b e  monotone i f  f o r  any M-so lu t ion  
f ,  and  a l l  p , h  
- 
8 f a i l s  t o  s a t i s f y  t h i s  t e s t  and  hence  was e m p h a t i c a l l y  r e j e c t e d .  
D i v i s o r  methods a r e  o b v i o u s l y  monotone. I n d e e d ,  it was f o r  
t h i s  r e a s o n  t h a t  t h e y  were  f o r m u l a t e d .  N o t i c e ,  moreover ,  t h a t  d i -  
v i s o r  methods have a  c e r t a i n  i n n e r  r e g u l a r i t y ;  namely, t h e  d e c i s i o n  
a s  t o  which p a r t y  of any p a i r  most  d e s e r v e s  t h e  e x t r a  s e a t  a s  t h e  
house  s i z e  i s  i n c r e a s e d  by 1  depends  o n l y  upon t h e  p o p u l a t i o n s  and 
s e a t s  a l r e a d y  a l l o c a t e d  t o  t h o s e  p a r t i e s  s i n g l y ,  and n o t  on t h e  
v o t e  v e c t o r  p  o r  t h e  v e c t o r  o f  s e a t s  s o  f a r  a l l o c a t e d  a .  
- 
More g e n e r a l l y ,  c o n s i d e r  a  method M and  suppose  t h a t  it h a s  
a  s o l u t i o n  f a l l o c a t i n g  t o  a  p a r t y  w i t h  p* v o t e s  a *  s e a t s  and  t o  
a  p a r t y  w i t h  v o t e s  s e a t s  i n  a  house  h ,  w h i l e  f a l l o c a t e s  t o  
t h e  s t a r - p a r t y  a *  + 1  s e a t s ,  and t o  t h e  b a r - p a r t y  Z s e a t s  i n  a  
house  h  + 1 .  Then t h e  s t a r - p a r t y  is  s a i d  t o  have wzak priority 
a t  t h a t  p o i n t ,  and t h i s  i s  w r i t t e n  ( p * , a * )  2 ( E r a ) .  A  n a t u r a l  
c r i t e r i o n  f o r  any method i s  t h a t  t h e  c l a i m s  of any two p a r t i e s  
f o r  a n  e x t r a  s e a t  s h o u l d  depend only o n  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  v o t e  
t o t a l s  and  a l l o c a t i o n s .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  i f  f o r  some o t h e r  a l l o c a -  
t i o n  problem w i t h  v o t e s  p '  t h e r e  a r e  p a r t i e s  h a v i n g  v o t e s  p* and  
p t h a t  a r e  a l l o c a t e d ,  by-a  s o l u t i o n  o f  M, a *  and a s e a t s  r e s p e c -  
t i v e l y ,  and  a l s o  ( E r a )  5 ( p * , a * ) ,  t h e n  t h e  p a r t i e s  a r e  s a i d  t o  be  
tied, and t h i s  i s  w r i t t e n  ( p * , a * ) - ( 6 , s ) .  A method i s  s a i d  t o  b e  
consistent i f  it t r e a t s  t i e d  p a r t i e s  e q u a l l y ,  t h a t  i s ,  i f  ( p * , a * )  
( p , a )  i m p l i e s  f h  h a s  b o t h  a n  e x t e n s i o n  g i v i n g  t h e  s t a r - p a r t y  
a *  + 1  s e a t s  a t  h  + 1 ,  a n d  a n  e x t e n s i o n  g i v i n g  t h e  b a r - p a r t y  
+ 1  s e a t s  a t  h  + 1 .  Any two p a r t i e s  w i l l  n a t u r a l l y  compare 
t h e i r  r e s u l t a n t  numbers o f  s e a t s :  a  change i n  p r i o r i t i e s  c o u l d  
n o t  b u t  b e  viewed a s  c o n f l i c t i n g  w i t h  common s e n s e .  Note t h a t  
any c o n s i s t e n t  method i s  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  symmetr ic .  
* 
The p r o j e c t i l e  and r a c q u e t ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  i n  badminton.  
D i v i s o r  methods a r e  c l e a r l y  c o n s i s t e n t .  The Hamilton method 
i s  n o t .  F o r  c o n s i d e r  t h e  g a l l o c a t i o n s  o f  T a b l e  4 .  P a r t i e s  D and 
E r e c e i v e  5  and 3  s e a t s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  f o r  h  = 35 and u n i q u e l y  
r e c e i v e d  5 and 4 f o r  h  = 36. However, t h e y  r e c e i v e  5  and 3,  r e -  
s p e c t i v e l y ,  f o r  h  = 38, and u n i q u e l y  6  and 3  f o r  h  = 39. T h i s  
p r o v i d e s  one  more argument a g a i n s t  t h e  Hamil ton method. 
L e t  r ( p , a )  be  any r e a l - v a l u e d  f u n c t i o n  o f  two r e a l  v a r i a b l e s  
c a l l e d  a  r a n k - i n d e x  ( p o s s i b l y  i n c l u d i n g  f m f o r  c e r t a i n  v a l u e s  o f  
p  and a ) .  Given a  rank- index ,  a  ( g e n e r a l i z e d )  S u n t i n g t o n  method 
[ 3 ]  o f  a l l o c a t i o n  @ i s  t h e  set  o f  a l l  s o l u t i o n s  f o b t a i n e d  re- 
c u r s i v e l y  a s  f o l l o w s :  
(ii) i f  a  = f i ( p , h )  i s  a n  M a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  h  and k  i s  some i - 
one  p a r t y  f o r  which 
r ( p k , a l )  2 r ( p . a . 1  f o r  1  ( i 5 s 
1 1  
t h e n  
f k ( p l h + l )  = a k  + 1 , f i ( e l h + l )  = a i  f o r  i # k  . 
Hunt ing ton  methods a r e  a  d i r e c t  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  d i v i s o r  methods. 
They a r e  c l e a r l y  monotone and c o n s i s t e n t .  L e s s  o b v i o u s  i s  
Theorem 3 [ 2 ] .  Any c o n s i s t e n t ,  mono tone  method o f  a Z Z o c a t i o n  
i s  a  H u n t i n g t o n  me thod .  
There  do,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  e x i s t  r a t h e r  dub ious  Hunt ing ton  
methods. F o r  example,  t a k e  r ( p , a )  = a/p.  Then t h e  f i r s t  p a r t y  
t o  r e c e i v e  o n e  s e a t  must n e c e s s a r i l y  r e c e i v e  a l l .  W e  w i l l  s a y  
t h a t  a  method i s  b a l a n c e d  i f  two p a r t i e s  h a v i n g  i d e n t i c a l  v o t e  
t o t a l s  a r e  a lways a l l o c a t e d  numbers o f  s e a t s  t h a t  d i f f e r  by a t  
most 1 .  D i v i s o r  methods a r e  b a l a n c e d ;  s o  i s  t h e  Hamil ton method 
But Hunt ing ton  methods i n  g e n e r a l  a r e  n o t .  A method t h a t  i s  n o t  
b a l a n c e d  c o u l d  n o t  b e  countenanced .  
COALITIONS AND SCHISMS 
I n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  it i s  i m p o r t a n t  
t o  a s k ,  n o t  o n l y  whe ther  methods a r e  s t a b l e ,  b u t  a l s o  whe ther  t h e y  
t e n d  t o  encourage  p a r t i e s  t o  merge o r  t o  s p l i n t e r .  For  p o l i t i c a Z  
s t a b i l i t y  it would u s u a l l y  be c o n s i d e r e d  d e s i r a b l e  t o  have methods 
o f  a l l o c a t i o n  t h a t  encourage  p a r t i e s  t o  c o a l e s c e  by a s s u r i n g  t h a t  
t h i s  would never  c o s t  s e a t s ,  b u t  c o u l d  i n  f a c t  r e s u l t  i n  a n  i n c r e a s e  
i n  t h e  t o t a l  number o f  s e a t s  a l l o c a t e d  j o i n t l y  t o  t h e  p a r t i e s .  
To make these ideas precise, consider a symetric stable 
method M and a problem with vote totals p in which one party has 
p* votes and another p votes; and considzr the result of coalesc- 
lng the star- and the bar-party into one party with p* + p votes, 
keeping all other party vote totals the same. Let f E M be a 
solution in which a* and Z are the number of seats allocated to 
the star- and the bar-party, respectively, in an allocation for h. 
Then M is said to encourage  c o a Z i t i o n s  if there exists an alloca- 
tion giving the coalesced party b seats with b 2 a* + a, and to 
e n c o u r a g e  s c h i s m s  if b 5 a* + 2. 
A method M is said to be u n i q u e  satisfying certain properties 
if any other set M' of allocation solutions with the same proper- 
ties is also a set of solutions by :, that is, M'c !. 
Theorem 4 .  The J e f f e r s o n  method J i s  t h e  u n i q u e  c o n s i s t e n t ,  
monotone  and b a l a n c e d  method t h a t  e n c o u r a g e s  c o a l i t i o n s .  
Viewed in this light the Jefferson method presents strong 
credentials for being adopted in a proportional representation 
system. Sainte-Lague appears to have realized the tendency of J 
to encourage coalitions, but he gave no proofs and his statement 
has the curiosity of referring to a comparison: "In comparing the 
two rules, one can show that the d'Hondt rule ( J )  favors the group- 
ing of parties which, by coalescing, may receive more seats; where- 
as the method of least squares (y) favors neither groupings nor 
schisms," [15, p. 3781. 
p r o o f :  Since J is a divisor method, it is easily seen that 
it is consistent, monotone, and balanced. To show that J encour- 
ages coalitions, let 9 be a Jefferson allocation of h for given 
vote totals p, and consider the vote totals (p1+p2,p3,...,pS) in 
- 
- 
which parties 1 and 2 have formed a coalition. If (a1+a2,a3,...,as) 
is not a solution, then by the Lemma, 
Since a is a Jefferson allocation, 
(p1+p2)/(al+a2) 2 min{pl/al,p2/a2/ai)  max p./(a .+l) , j#1,2' 7 
so the only reason (5) can hold is that 
(6) (p1+p2)/(al+a2+1) > min p./ai = p /a = 6 (II#1,2) . 
i#1,2 1 II II 
On the other hand, 
(p1+p2)/ (al+a2+2) 2 max Ipl/ (al+l) ,p2/ (a2+1 1 
(7) 
< min p./a. < 6 , 
= j ] ] =  
hence, combining (6) and (7), 
min I(p1+p2)/(al+a2+1),pL/(aL-11, min p./a.) 2 6 
j#1,2,~ 7 
which shows (by the Lemma) that (a +a +l,a3,...,aL-l,...,as) 1 2  
is a Jefferson allocation for h. 
Conversely, let g be any method having the stated properties. 
Then M is a Huntington method, hence (by Theorem 3) has a rank- 
index r(p,a) . Since M is balanced, r(p,a) > r(p,a+l) > . . . > 
r(p,a+k) for any integer k > 0. It will be shown that r(p,a) is 
equivalent to p/ (a+l ) . 
As a first step we show that r(p,a) = r(np,na+n-1) for all 
integers n 2 1. Consider the vote vector p = (pl,. .. ,P,+~) = 
(p, . . . ,p) and house size h = (n+l)a + n for any integer a 2 0. 
Since M is balanced we can assume an allocation for h (a,a+l, ..., 
a+l). Now consider the vote vector (p,np) and a corresponding 
two-party allocation for h, say (x,y). By coalition encourage- 
ment there exists a solution with y , na + n and hence x ( a. 
There is a lowest h' ( h such that the second party (with vote 
total np) has y seats and the first some x - k seats, k 2 0. 
Thus r(np,y-1) 2 r(p,x-k) 2 - r(p,x) and so 
Consider, instead, the vote vector (pl,. .. ,p2n) = (p,. . . ,p) 
and house size h = 2na + n. M balanced implies that it must have 
an allocation of form (a+l, ..., a+l,a, ..., a) with ai = a + 1 for 
1 5 i 5 n and a. = a for n + 1 5 i ( 2n. Now consider the vote 
- - - 
totals (P~,...,P~,P~+~) = p,...,p, np) and let (xl, ..., xn,y) be an 
allocation of M for h = 2na + n. Since M is stable, y ( na + n - 1, 
and t h u s  t h e r e  i s  a n  i w i t h  1 ( i ( n  h a v i n g  x .  > a  + 1 .  There  
- - 1 - 
i s  a  l o w e s t  h '  ( h  such  t h a t  p a r t y  i h a s  xi s e a t s  and t h e  ( n + l ) s t  
p a r t y  ( w i t h  v o t e  t o t a l  np)  some y  - k  s e a t s ,  k  0 .  Thus 
r ( p , x i - l )  2 r (np,y-k)  2 r ( n p , y )  and s o  
which,  w i t h  ( 8 )  , shows t h a t  r ( p , a )  = r (np,  na+n-1) . 
TO c o m p l e t e  t h e  p roof  suppose  p/ ( a + l )  = p ' /  ( a l + l  ) . Then 
i m p l y i n g  t h a t  r ( p , a )  = R ( p / ( a + l ) )  f o r  some f u n c t i o n  R.  R i s  
o r d e r - p r e s e r v i n g ,  f o r  suppose  p / ( a + l )  < p l / ( a ' + l ) .  Then p a '  + 
p  < p f a  + p f ,  and 
which c o m p l e t e s  t h e  p r o o f . 0  
The method o f  s m a l l e s t  d i v i s o r s  i s ,  i n  a  c e r t a i n  s e n s e ,  
" symmet r ic"  w i t h  J. T h i s  s u g g e s t s  
Theorem 5. The method of smallest divisors S-D is the unique 
consistent, monotone and balanced method that encourages schisms. 
Proof: We f i r s t  show t h a t  r ( p , a )  = r ( n p , n a )  f o r  a l l  i n t e g e r s  
n  1 .  C o n s i d e r  t h e  v o t e  v e c t o r  ( p l ,  ..., 
- P , + ~ )  = (P ,  . . . I ~ )  and 
house  s i z e  h  = na + a  + 1  f o r  a n y  i n t e g e r  a  2 0 .  M b a l a n c e d  i m -  
p l i e s  t h a t  a n  a l l o c a t i o n  a t  h  h a s  form ( a + l , a ,  ..., a ) .  Now con- 
s i d e r  ( p , n p )  and any a l l o c a t i o n  o f  ! ( x , y ) .  By sch i sm encourage-  
ment t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  s o l u t i o n  w i t h  y  ( - n a  and hence  x , a  + 1 .  An 
argument  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h a t  g i v e n  i n  Theorem 4 shows t h a t  f o r  
k ,  0 
C o n s i d e r ,  i n s t e a d ,  t h e  v o t e  v e c t o r  ( p l , .  . . , p Z n )  = ( P I .  - .  I P )  
and house  s i z e  h  = 2na + n .  M b a l a n c e d  i m p l i e s  ( a ,  ..., a , a + l ,  ..., 
a + l )  i s  a n  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  h .  NOW c o n s i d e r  t h e  v o t e  v e c t o r  ( p l ,  . . . ,  
p n , p n + l )  = ( p ,  . . . , p ,  n p ) .  S i n c e  8 i s  s t a b l e  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a n  
a l l o c a t i o n  ( x l ,  ..., x n , y )  w i th  y  2 na + 1 and s o  t h e r e  must be  
some i, 1  ( i 5 n,  w i t h  xi 2 a .  So, w e  o b t a i n  a s  b e f o r e  
which, w i t h  ( l o ) ,  shows t h a t  r ( p , a )  = r ( np ,na )  . The proof t h a t  
S-D r e s u l t s  from t h e  s t a t e d  p r o p e r t i e s  i s  completed by showing 
t h a t  r ( p , a )  = R(p/a )  f o r  some o r de r - p r e s e r v ing  f u n c t i o n  R,  a s  i n  
t h e  proof  o f  Theorem 4 .  
That  S_D i s  c o n s i s t e n t ,  monotone and ba lanced  i s  c l e a r .  To 
show t h a t  it encourages  sch isms  r e q u i r e s  a n  argument t h a t  p r e -  
c i s e l y  p a r a l l e l s  t h e  co r r e s pond ing  p a r t  o f  t h e  proof  of Theorem 
4 .o 
SATISFYING OUOTA 
The i d e a l ,  e x a c t l y  p r o p o r t i o n a l  number o f  s e a t s  "due" p a r t y  
j i s  t h e  e x a c t  quo t a  q . ( p , h )  = p . h /  l p i  . Given p and h ,  i f  q  
I ' i  - i 
= q i ( ? , h )  i s  i n t e g e r  f o r  a l l  i t h e n  a  = q i  i s  a  seemingly pe r -  i 
f e c t  s o l u t i o n .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  w e  canno t  expec t  any of 
t h e  e x a c t  q u o t a s  t o  be i n t e g e r .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, it i s  n a t u r a l  
t o  r e q u i r e  t h a t  no p a r t y  r e c e i v e  more s e a t s  t h a n  t h e  r e s u l t  of 
" rounding"  qi  up ( [ q i l ,  t h e  s m a l l e s t  i n t e g e r  g r e a t e r  t h a n  o r  
e q u a l  t o  q . )  and no less t h a n  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  " rounding"  q .  down 
1 
( [ q i l .  t h e  l a r g e s t  i n t e g e r  less t h an  o r  e q u a l  t o  q i ) .  A method 
i s  s a i d  t o  s a t i s f y  q u o t a  i f  a l l  of i t s  a l l o c a t i o n s  s a t i s f y  [ q . ]  
1 
< a .  < [ q i l .  A l l o c a t i o n s  n o t  s a t i s f y i n g  quo t a  seem t o  v i o l a t e  
-
 1 = 
common s e n s e ,  and have proven t o  be p o l i t i c a l l y  s u b j e c t  t o  a t t a c k  
[171. 
As ide  from t h e  f a i r n e s s  q u e s t i o n ,  a  method s a t i s f y i n g  quo t a  
c l e a r l y  i s  ba l anced ,  and--while n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  s t a b l e  i n  t h e  
s t r i c t  s e n s e  d e f i n e d  above-- is  a l m o s t  s t a b l e  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  
i f  any two p a r t i e s  w i t h  a *  and s e a t s  c o a l e s c e ,  t h e n  t h e  c o a l e s c e d  
p a r t y  r e c e i v e s  b  s e a t s ,  where a *  + 2 - 2 5 - b  5 - a*  + a + 2. 
The Hamilton method (H)  c l e a r l y  s a t i s f i e s  quota-- indeed can  
be  s a i d  t o  have been mot iva ted  by t h i s  d e s i r e .  However, a s  w e  
have s een ,  it v i o l a t e s  two o t h e r  b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e s .  As ide  from H I  
what o t h e r  methods s a t i s f y  q u o t a ?  The emphasis  h i s t o r i c a l l y ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  s i n c e  Hun t in g ton ' s  work, h a s  been on d i v i s o r  methods. 
However, none of  t h e s e  ca n  s a t i s f y  quo t a .  I n  f a c t ,  a  subsequent  
r e s u l t  (Theorem 7 )  i m p l i e s  t h e  f o l l owing .  
Theorem 6 .  T h e r e  e x i s t s  no  a l l o c a t i o n  method t h a t  i s  mono- 
t o n e ,  c o n s i s t e n t  and s a t i s f i e s  q u o t a .  
Since these three properties seem to be essential ones, an 
immediate question is: what can be weakened in order to admit 
the existence of some method? 
In the presence of monotonicity and satisfying quota it is 
reasonable to consider a slight weakening of consistency. Con- 
sider a method M and let f E M with f,(p,h) = a;. Then party j 
J - J 
is said to be e l i g i b l e  a t  h+l for its (a.+l)st seat if aj + 1 5 
I  
{pj (h+l)/ 1 ipil; equivalently, a < q. (p,h+l) = p. (h+l)/ 1 ipi, j I -  I 
that'is if party j can be given an extra seat without exceeding 
upper quota. We say that a method M is q u o t a - c o n s i s t e n t *  if it 
is consistent as between eligible parties. More precisely, (p*,a) 
has weak e l i g i b l e  p r i o r i t y  over (P,Z) written (p*,a*) ie (p,Z), if 
in some problem one party having p* votes and a* seats has weak 
priority over another party having P votes and Z seats and b o t h  
a r e  e l i g i b l e  to receive another seat. If both (p*,a*) te (PIZ) 
e 
and (F,Z) te (p*,a*) we write (p*,a*) - ( . For M to be 
e quota-consistent it is required that whenever (p*,a*) - (6,s) and 
both parties are eligible at h+l but f gives the (h+l)st seat to 
the p*-party, then there is an extension of fh giving the (h+l) st 
instead to the P-party. 
The q u o t a  method Q of allocation is the set of all solutions 
f obtained recursively-as follows: 
(ii) Let ai = fi(p,h) be an allocation for h of O and 
- - 
E(h+l) the set of parties eligible to receive an 
extra seat at h + 1. If k E E (h+l) is some one 
party for which 
Pk/(ak+l) 2 pi/(ai+l for all i E E (h+l) 
then 
fk(erh+l) = ak + 1 , fi(p,h+l) - = ai for i # k . 
* 
Called "consistent" in [1,3]. 
Theorem 7 [4]. Q i s  t h e  u n i q u e  a Z Z o e a t i o n  method t h a t  i s  
house -mono tone ,  q u o t a - c o n s i s t e n t  and s a t i s f i e s  q u o t a .  
This theorem gives powerful reasons for acceptance of the 
quota method Q for both problems of apportionment in majority 
systems and problems of allocation in proportional representation 
systems. In practice one finds that Q has a tendency to produce 
solutions that round up the exact quotas of large parties more 
often than those of small parties. This seems reasonable for the 
application of g to proportional representation systems in that 
it inferentially asks for a "large" vote before according any 
representation at all. Notice, however, that no large party is 
allowed more seats than its upper quota. This same property might 
appear to cause a difficulty for the application of 0 to apportion- 
ment problems, since in this situation it is usuallySnecessary for 
each geographical entity to receive some minimum number of seats 
(e.g., 1 or 2). For this case the method Q has an immediate gen- 
eralization that allows the specification 6f any desired "unbiased" 
minimum representations for districts, and a uniqueness theorem 
similar to Theorem 7 obtains [3] . 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has addressed the problem of the allocation of 
integral representation to parties having vote totals in a pro- 
portional representation system. The principal point is that 
methods of allocation should not be chosen by bickering over 
numbers, nor, indeed, through ad hoe claims of various mechani- 
cal procedures, but rather by analysis of the properties of 
methods. The issue is to decide upon a method whose qualitative 
properties are equitable for the situation at hand. For propor- 
tional representation systems this analysis commends one of two 
methods: the quota method Q or the Jefferson method J .  
-. 
The Jefferson method claims recognition because it is mono- 
tone, consistent, balanced and encourages coalitions. Specifical- 
ly, encouraging coalitions would seem to be precisely the type of 
stability desired for a body politic operating a proportional 
representation system. However, a major defect of J is that it 
fails the seemingly most common-sense test of satisfying quota. 
The Quota method merits recognition because it does satisfy quota, 
is consistent subject to that property, and is monotone and bal- 
anced. But it is only almost stable, and, in fact, does not 
necessarily encourage coalitions. 
The choice between these methods of allocation should be 
made in terms of which c r i t e r i a  are viewed as most important for 
the situation in question. 
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